David H. Jacob v. Rosalyn Cotton, Chairperson, Nebraska Board of Parole, et al.
AdministrativeLaw DueProcess
Do Nebraska's current parole procedures still meet the requirements of the 14th Amendment's Due Process clause under the test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and used by the Greenholtz Court?
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED : Nebraska's parole procedures have been greatly altered since the U.S. Supreme Court found Nebraska statutes created a liberty interest in that 1979 decision: Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442 U.S. "1 (1979). The Greenholtz Court said: The Nebraska procedure affords an opportunity to be heard, and-when parole: is. denied’ it informs the: inmate inwhat respects he falls short of qualifying for parole; this affords the process that is due under these circumstances. The Constitution does not require more. Id. at 16 1. Do Nebraska's current parole procedures still meet the requirements of the 14th Amendment's Due Process clause under the test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and used by the Greenholtz Court? Subsidiary questions fairly included; Rule 14.1(a): 2. In the liberty interest in parole context, does "the opportunity to be heard'no longer guarantee "notice and a meaningful opportunity to rebut" the evidence the Parole Board relies upon for its' decision? 3. Does it now require a state statutory right to parole to have a liberty interest in parole procedures that the 14th Amendment's Due Process clause will guarantee?