If a defendant is prevented from presenting a complete defense by the exclusion of a substantial expert witness, has there been a violation of his federal constitutional rights, and if counsel is at fault is prejudice under Strickland satisfied?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . Introduction: Mr. Hilton was indicted for murder and other offenses stemming from an automobile accident which occurred while he was under the influence of alcohol. Medical records and other discovery materials were provided to defense counsel ten months prior to trial. The trial court entered an order requiring disclosure of intent to present expert testimony at least thirty days prior to trial. Six days after the expert notice requirement expired, numerous pages of additional medical records were provided to the defense which prompted counsel to request the trial be continued to a later date. The trial court denied the continuance but granted funding for counsel to retain a medical expert. Halfway through the prosecution's case in chief, on the second day of trial the court denied counsel's oral notice to present testimony of the recently retained medial expert. . The above facts resulted in three claims for post conviction relief: 1) the trial court erred by failing to grant a continuance; 2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely meet the trial court's expert notice deadline; and, 3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of the defense's medical expert. Question I: If a defendant is prevented, either by the court or his counsel, from presenting a complete defense by the exclusion of a substantial expert witness, but the testimony in the record through avowal does not provide a legal defense under state law, has there been a violation of his federal constitutional rights, and if counsel is at fault is prejudice under Strickland satisfied? Question II: During appellate review of a habeas corpus claim submitted by a state prisoner, does a Federal Circuit Court, after finding the state courts and the district court mischaracterized and failed to address Petitioner's presented claim, run afoul of the AEDPA by making factual determinations de novo from state findings previously given deference on other claims? Question IIT: When reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, if a State court in setting forth the standard of review, correctly recites what constitutes “prejudice” under Strickland, but during its analysis denying relief, uses terminology such as: “exonerate,” “lose what he otherwise would have won,” or “defeat was snatched from this hands of probable victory,” does the court employ a standard contrary to clearly established federal law, and if so does it mandate a habeas court to conduct de novo review?