Whether a defendant's forging of a signature of a bank employee on a lien release, used as supporting documentation for a bank loan in the defendant's own name, is sufficiently central to the underlying offense to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A

QUESTION PRESENTED On June 8, 2023, this Court issued an opinion in Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (20283), in which it narrowed the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, the aggravated identity theft statute, to limit its reach to only those cases where the defendant’s “use” of another’s means of identification is at the “crux” of the underlying offense. /d. at 132. In a concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch opined that the new standard left much to interpretation and would prove difficult to apply in practice, leading lower courts to reach inconsistent conclusions. Jd. at 134-39, (Gorsuch, J. concurring). Since the Dubin decision, circuit and district courts have in fact struggled to apply the “crux” test, leading to inconsistent results, as forecast by Justice Gorsuch. This Court should grant review to clarify the contours of the test, and to provide lower courts with guidance as to factors that render a particular use of another’s identity at the “crux” of the primary offense. The question presented here is: Whether a defendant’s forging of a signature of a bank employee on a lien release, used as supporting documentation for a bank loan in the defendant’s own name, is sufficiently central to the underlying offense to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, where the bank employee suffered no loss and where the primary offense involved the defendant providing inflated salary and employment information for herself. i