Whether a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. §3559(c)'s residual clause predicated on Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), is cognizable in a second or successive motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255(h)(2)

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW The “Three Strikes” statute, 18 U.S.C. §3559(c) is one of the most severe recidivist enhancements under the law; it imposes mandatory life sentences. It contains a catch-all residual clause that is virtually identical to other statutory residual clauses previously found to be vague and unconstitutional. This Court first struck down the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. §924(e) (“ACCA”), in its seminal case Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). Further progeny struck down similar residual clauses in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 U.S. 1204 (2018) (recidivist statute, 18 U.S.C. §16(b)) and United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019) (substantive crime, 18 U.S.C. §924(c)). Because this trilogy narrowed criminal statutes by striking down vague residual clauses, Johnson and its progeny were retroactively applicable, enabling defendants to seek relief through postconviction proceedings, including second or successive motions to vacate sentence. Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016). In light of the above, the question presented for review is: Whether a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. §3559(c)’s residual clause predicated on Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), is cognizable in a second or successive motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255(h)(2). i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no