Where counsel's renunciation of representation leads to a procedural default in state post-conviction proceedings that provide the initial opportunity to challenge ineffectiveness of trial counsel, does that renunciation constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas proceedings?

Question Presented At a hearing to determine whether Richard Tabler could waive his right to state habeas review, his attorneys explicitly refused to participate, declaring that they “d[id] not announce ready[] because we do not intend to take a position one way or the other.” Counsel left Mr. Tabler to proceed on his own. They did not object to the court’s erroneous instructions indicating that his habeas proceedings began only after his direct appeal concluded, meaning he could change his mind at any time before the direct appeal decision. And they never told the court about an expert report detailing their client’s severe mental impairments. The court proceeded without asking Mr. Tabler whether he wanted alternative counsel or intended to waive his state right to counsel. Instead, it elicited Mr. Tabler’s assertion, “I’m competent enough,” and determined he was competent to proceed. Mr. Tabler later attempted to revive his habeas proceedings within the time the state court had indicated he could do so, but by then he had missed the actual deadline for filing, a date no one had informed him about. As a result, federal courts on habeas review held that he had procedurally defaulted his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. This Court held in Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012), that counsel’s abandonment of a client in state court proceedings severs the agency relationship between counsel and client and excuses procedural default in federal habeas proceedings. And in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), it held that cause to excuse procedural default also arises where counsel is either ineffective or absent in state i post-conviction proceedings that provide the initial opportunity to review ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims. The court below refused to apply either decision to excuse default here. The question presented is: Where counsel’s renunciation of representation leads to a procedural default in state post-conviction proceedings that provide the initial opportunity to challenge ineffectiveness of trial counsel, does that renunciation constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas proceedings? ii