May a state categorically exclude youth as a mitigating factor in a capital case?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW One of the foundational principles of this Court’s postFurman death penalty jurisprudence bans states from excluding consideration of youth as mitigation. Nebraska has done just that by limiting construction of the statutorily prescribed mitigating circumstance of “age” to advanced age or senility. Nebraska’s refusal to consider youth and this Court’s precedents presents the following questions: 1. May a state categorically exclude youth as a mitigating factor in a capital case? 2. Must a state court follow this Court’s jurisprudence of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993), and Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004), or may it ignore it? 3. Can appellate counsel be ineffective for failing to raise such a claim on direct appeal given this Court’s clear precedent establishing error? ii PROCEEDINGS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THIS CASE 1. Madison County District Court Sentencing Opinion: State v. Galindo, Case No. CR-02-235, Journal Entry (Nov. 10, 2004); 2. Nebraska Supreme Court’s Direct Appeal Opinion: State v. Galindo, 278 Neb. 599 (2009): 3. United States Supreme Court denial of certiorari: Galindo v. Nebraska, 559 U.S. 1010 (2010); 4, Madison County District Court Order Denying Galindo’s Amended Postconviction Petition: State v. Galindo, Case No. CR-02-235, Journal Entry (April 28, 2021); 5. Nebraska Supreme Court’s Post-Conviction Appeal Opinion: State v. Galindo, 315 Neb. 1 (2023). ili