Whether a new criminal trial requires trial error that would have been reversible on appeal

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Petition implicates two splits in the Circuits. First, a district judge can grant a new criminal trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 33(a). The Circuits do not agree about whether a new trial requires trial error that would have been reversible on appeal. Compare, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 251 F.3d 273, 280 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he error, if any, was harmless. The motion for a new trial should not have been granted.”), with United States v. Scroggins, 379 F.3d 233, 255 (5 Cir. 2004) (“A miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial in certain circumstances may occur even when there has been no specific legal error.” (citations and footnote omitted)). Second, a district court “shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Yet, “a circuit split [exists] on the issue of whether a defendant must object at sentencing to preserve error on appeal” over the insufficiency of the district court’s explanation. United States v. MondragonSantiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5 Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To resolve those Circuit splits, Mr. Parker asks this Court to answer the following: 1. Did the Sixth Circuit err in affirming the district court’s denial of Mr. Parker’s motion for new trial; and 2. Did Mr. Parker preserve for appeal a claim of insufficiency of the district court’s sentencing explanation? i