Whether the Supreme Court of North Carolina was free to reject evidence of disparate treatment and impose on Petitioner the crippling burden of showing that the prosecution had a proven history of discriminating against Black potential jurors in order to establish a prima facie case under Batson?

QUESTION PRESENTED The courts of North Carolina have a long history of failing to enforce Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Tried by an all-white jury in 1996, the case of this African American man exemplifies North Carolina’s resistance to fulfilling the promise of equal treatment in jury selection. Years after trial, Petitioner discovered the State had relied on a training handout to guide its responses to his Batson objections. The transcript of jury selection shows that, in explaining his peremptory strikes to the trial judge, one of the prosecutors read from the handout’s list of suggested reasons. Petitioner also presented statistical evidence showing that, in capital cases, prosecutors in the county where Petitioner was tried were more than twice as likely to strike eligible venire members who were Black than other races. Additionally, in the course of four death penalty cases, one of his trial prosecutors struck Black potential jurors at more than triple the rate of other potential jurors. A majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the use of the training handout as not probative of discrimination, saying, “We can discern no possible scenario in which, had defendant possessed this CLE handout, it would have assisted defendant in carrying his burden at step one.” State v. Tucker, 895 S.E.2d 532, 550 (N.C. 2023). In contrast, the dissent found evidence the prosecutor read from the handout was relevant to the question of whether the State’s reasons were pretextual and concluded the handout was “an important piece of substantive evidence” supporting Petitioner’s claim. Id. at 568 (Earls, J., dissenting). ii The majority strongly condemned Petitioner’s statistical evidence as flawed and unreliable. Id. at 555-56. Its concern was that researchers from Michigan State University (MSU) did not limit their study of strike rates to cases in which the defendant had raised a successful Batson objection. According to the majority, the MSU study “inaptly imputed racial motives to peremptory strikes for cases in which Batson arguments had not been made or Batson violations had not been found.” Id. at 555. In dissent, Justice Earls said it was legal error to disregard the MSU study and the majority had “placed an impermissibly high burden” on Petitioner. Id. at 574 (Earls, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that under the majority’s logic, “it would be impossible for any defendant to rely on any study detailing the disparate use of peremptory challenges against people of color in North Carolina.” Jd. This is so because, in the nearly 40 years since this Court decided Batson, North Carolina appellate courts have only once found a substantive Batson violation. Id. The questions presented for review are two: I. Whether the Supreme Court of North Carolina was free to reject evidence of disparate treatment and impose on Petitioner the crippling burden of showing that the prosecution had a proven history of discriminating against Black potential jurors in order to establish a prima facie case under Batson? Il. Whether the Supreme Court of North Carolina violated this Court’s clear precedent when it declined to consider all of the evidence relevant to his Batson claim, including the State’s reliance on a ready-made list to explain its strikes of African Americans? iti INDEX CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED. 2 SUMMARY OF PETITIONER’S BATSON CLAIM 4 I. The Supreme Court of North Carolina improperly dismissed Petitioner’s evidence of disparate treatment and imposed a crippling burden of showing the prosecution had a proven history of discriminating against Black potential jurors in order to establish a prima facie case under Batson. .cesssccecessc