Plea-agreement-violation,contract-law,conflict-of-interest

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1) Do additional restrictions, such as Strickland, imposed in the standard collat= < eral attack waiver that are not specifically stated anywhere in Mr. Offineer's plea agreement violate contract laws as established in decisions like Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-263 (1971) and Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019)? Does the collateral attack waiver in the plea agreement create a conflict of interest between defense counsel and Mr. Offineer? 2) Did the appellate court rule contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)(2) and the equal protection clause that Mr. Offineer had waived his constitutional right of access to the courts when he signed the plea agreement despite the impediment to this right occurring before he signed the plea agreement? Did the impediment to a law library negate Mr. Offineer's right to knowingly and willingly enter into the plea agreement and to provide for his own defense? 3) Was defense counsel ineffective in developing and explaining viable defensive . strategies to Mr. Offineer before advising him to plead guilty? 4) Was defense counsel ineffective by relying on Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) to argue for the suppression of evidence obtained from the warrantless computer search? Did the appellate court incorrectly rule that because the warrants authorized the agents to search for evidence of CEM, they were authorized to search Mr. Offineer's computers without a specific warrant for them? 5) Did the appellate court issue a ruling contradictory to Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) and Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 542 (2000) in stating that Mr. Offineer's pleadings are too conclusory and impermissibly vague? 6) Is the appellate court's ruling that defense counsel was correct to deny Mr. Offineer an appeal because that appeal would have been "meritless" and "futile" in contradiction to established precedents and the principle? 7) Was defense counsel ineffective in accepting the disparate terms of Mr. Offineer's (ii) QUESTIONS PRESENTED (cont. ) 7) plea agreement as described by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)? Was the district court's acceptance of Mr. Offineer's plea contrary to the law as established under 18, U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)? Is Mr. Offineer's sentence contrary to the Eight aAmendment's narrow proportionality principle, his right to equality, and equal protection under the law? 8) Was defense counsel ineffective by failing to remove information concerning Count I, specifically the listing of 2 victims, because that count was dropped as part of the plea agreement? Is Mr. Offineer now unfairly burdened in trying to have that information corrected through the B.O.P.'s "administrative remedy" process which does not allow him to have legal representation? Is the PSR fundamentally . flawed, unfair, and unjust because inaccurate information may not be removed even ; after being found incorrect? (iii)