Where reasonable jurists could debate whether a petitioner is entitled to Rule 60 relief where the State has concealed evidence

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (1) Where two judges on the lower court panel found that “no reasonable jurist could conclude that the district court abused its discretion” in denying relief under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, doc. 19, at 6-9, and one judge concurred in the result but found that Mr. Mills “has sufficiently alleged the denial of a constitutional right” and he “has met the threshold requirement to obtain a COA,” doc. 19-1, at 15, 18, does the denial of a COA conflict with this Court’s decision in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003), requiring a COA to issue where “reasonable jurists could debate . . . the issues presented,” and recognizing that “a claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree ... that [the] petitioner will not prevail”? (2) Whether reasonable jurists could debate whether a petitioner is entitled to Rule 60 relief where the State has concealed evidence supporting Mr. Mills’ allegations of a plea agreement with its central witness for 17 years and evidence presented by both the petitioner and the State establish that the facts at issue were required to be disclosed and that the State had a duty to correct the false testimony at Mr. Mills’ capital trial? (3) | Whether reasonable jurists could debate whether the lower courts’ ruling violates this Court’s decision in Banks v. Dretke, which makes clear that defendants do not bear the burden of ferreting out prosecutorial misconduct or failures to disclose critical evidence: “A rule thus declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.” 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004)? i