Does the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard apply to a plaintiff's allegations of Article III standing?

QUESTION PRESENTED Twelve of the thirteen courts of appeals have held that in analyzing whether a plaintiff has alleged Article III standing, courts must apply the plausibility standard set out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). But the Ninth Circuit has held that plausibility is “ill-suited” to questions of Article III standing, Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2011), and that courts analyzing allegations of standing should instead demand only “‘general factual allegations of injury,” id.; accord Ernest Bock, LLC v. Steelman, 76 F.4th 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2023). Here, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit applied that antiquated standard, over a dissent that would have applied Twombly and Iqbal. And rather than grant rehearing to resolve the 12-1 circuit conflict, the panel later amended its opinion to delete its reference to Ninth Circuit precedent that rejects the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard, while leaving the rest of its analysis untouched. The question presented is: Does the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard apply to a plaintiff’s allegations of Article III standing?