Should-the-Rooker-Feldman-doctrine-apply-to-moot-decisions-by-state-courts

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner submitted his nomination to Respondents on August 13, 2020. The nomination petition was verified with 2200 valid signatures on August 19, 2020. However, Petitioner was notified on Sept 4, 2020 at 4:56 p.m., which was the Friday leading into Labor Day weekend that his name would not appear on the ballot because he only collected 827 signatures. The late notice prevent Petitioner from also becoming a write-in candidate as well. Georgia law stated that Tuesday September 8, 2020 was the last day a candidate could qualify as a write-in candidate. The law also requires the candidate to have placed an add in the newspaper by the morning of September 8, 2020, which was impossible because of the Labor Day holiday. Petitioner submitted his application for a writ of mandamus as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-171(c). Petitioner had to wait until September 15, 2020 even though the law states, “Upon the application being made, a judge of such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the matter in dispute as soon as practicable...” The superior court of Fulton County, Georgia stated Respondent Raffensberger was entitled to an extra five days before a hearing could be held because of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-2. There is no mention of 0.C.G.A. § 9-10-2 in the O.C.G.A. § 21-2-171(c) statue. Respondents lied to the trial court concerning evidence. Petitioner's application for writ of mandamus was denied by the Superior Court of Fulton County on September 17, 2020. Petitioner in accordance with 0.C.G.A. § 21-2-171(c) appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia on September 22, 2020, which was within the five days allotted to him. The Supreme Court of Georgia did not abide by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-171(c), which states “It shall be the duty of the appellate court to fix the hearing and to announce its decision within such period of time as will permit the name of the candidate affected by the court’s decision to appear on the ballot if the court should so determine.” Petitioner’s case was decided by the Georgia Supreme Court seven months later on May 3, 2021. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied on June 01, 2021. Respondents have never provided proof through the required verification statement that Petitioner only had valid 827 signatures. The signed verification statement of 2,200 valid still remains the only verification of how many valid signatures were counted for Petitioner in relation to his 2020 nomination petition. The following questions are presented. 1. Should the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have the same fraud-on-the-court exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals? 2. Was the Petitioner’s rights further violated by the courts, upon their omission or unacknowledged treatment of a clear set of facts, that clearly shows the verification statement was on one page and the cumulative total was on another was on another page, when the instructions say and other verification statements from other independent candidates show, the verification statement and cumulative total should be on the same page? 3. Does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only relate to affirmed decisions of a state’s highest court, or does it also pertain to decisions where none of the merits of the case were ruled ii upon because they were deemed to be moot (the mootness doctrine and Article ITI of the constitution)? 4, Is O.C.G.A. § 21-2-170(a)-(h) unconstitutional and does it violate the First and Fourteenth amendment rights of independent candidates and/or the First and Fourteenth amendment rights of the registered electorate those candidates seek to represent? 5. Are the appellate procedures under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-171(¢) unconstitutional and do they allow enough time for an independent candidate to effectively appeal to a Georgia superior court or Georgia appellate court in enough time that an error or crime can be discovered, that will enable that same candidate to have their name placed on the