When the existence of at least an informal, tacit, or unspoken deal between the prosecutor and his star informant-witness in a capital trial is self-evident from the postconviction record and is beyond any fairminded dispute, is the state court's rejection of a Brady/Napue claim, arising from the prosecutor's undisputed failure to disclose that deal, based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) when the rejection was premised on the state court's conclusion that the deal had not been sufficiently proven?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner was tried in Ohio in 1991 for an aggravated murder committed during a carjacking allegedly perpetrated by two men. The State’s entire case against Petitioner was based on testimony of an informant who was believed to have been involved in the crime and whose story against Petitioner evolved and expanded, to include new damaging claims, as the trial approached and after attending a private “trial preparation” session with the prosecutor. At the time the informant testified, he was himself facing his own felony prosecution by the same prosecutor’s office; yet, in his trial testimony, he denied any deal or expectation of one in exchange for his testimony. The prosecutor likewise denied a deal and failed to disclose one. Many years after Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death on the informant’s testimony, it was discovered in federal habeas that the prosecutor did indeed have at least an informal, tacit, or unspoken deal with the informant; the deal was evidenced in a “smoking gun” document which showed that, on the very day the trials of Petitioner and his co-defendant concluded, the prosecutor intervened in the informant’s felony case to request it be “continued” for “further investigation”; the informant’s case was later dismissed. Nonetheless, in denying Petitioner’s Brady/ Napue claims based in part on the undisclosed deal, the state courts in postconviction found that the deal had not been proven, and the federal habeas courts deferred under AEDPA to that unreasonable conclusion. Two questions are presented: (1) When the existence of at least an informal, tacit, or unspoken deal between the prosecutor and his star informant-witness in a capital trial is self-evident from the postconviction record and is beyond any fairminded dispute, is the state court’s rejection of a Brady/Napue claim, arising from the prosecutor’s i undisputed failure to disclose that deal, based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) when the rejection was premised on the state court’s conclusion that the deal had not been sufficiently proven? (2) When the evidence suppressed from Petitioner at his 1991 capital murder trial is found to also include the prosecutor’s undisclosed deal with his star witness and the star witness’ false denials of that deal, does the totality of the State’s suppressions, considered cumulatively as required by this Court’s precedent, entitle Petitioner to habeas relief on his Brady/Napue cla