Whether Congress intended to treat 'excusable neglect' and 'good cause' separately in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) and the appropriate standard of review

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-Rule 4(a) (“Fed R. App. P.) provides that in a civil case the notice of appeal required by Fed R. App. P. 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. In matters of late filing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A) (ii) provides the district court may extend time for filing a notice of appeal upon a showing of “excusable neglect” or “good cause.” Congress unmistakably intended these two terms to be treated separately. In Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), the Court had the occasion and previously acknowledged that Congress intended to distinguish each of these terms and recognized a district court’s discretion in matters of excusable neglect, citing equitable powers to deny or grant an application to file late based on a four-factor analysis explaining that the factors to be considered include “[1] the danger of prejudice to the [nonmovant], [2] the length of the delay and its potential impact on _ judicial proceedings, [3] the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and [4] whether the movant acted in good faith.” Id. at 395. Although Pioneer settled the dispute among the lower courts by guiding the district court’s in applying equitable powers to forgive late filings based on “excusable neglect” with review of its powers weighed against the four Pioneer factors for an abuse of discretion, it did not articulate guidance, or a standard of review i concerning the lower court’s limited powers based on “good cause” where “intervening circumstances” are present, understanding that Congress intended to excuse a late filing in the absence of a filers fault, essentially in matters of impossibility or similar circumstances. The result is that the lower courts have subsumed the “good cause” term without due consideration of its separate domain erroneously applying Pioneer’s 374 and 4th equitable factors “the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant” and “whether the movant acted in good faith.” Doing so ignores situations where “intervening circumstances” show there is no fault on the part of the filer making it nondiscretionary mandating de novo review for clear error of fact and law as congress intended. The questions presented are: 1. Whether in overview of the textual language set forth in Fed. R. App. P 4(a)(5)(A)Gi) did Congress afford differing terms allowing the lower courts to exercise their full discretion in asserting equitable powers when granting or denying relief for “excusable neglect”, but limited the power to deny a late filing, one for “good cause” differing it based upon a showing of intervening circumstances without fault of the filer mandating a standard of de novo review under a clear error of fact and law standard. 2. Whether the Court should clarify its holdings and guidance in Pioneer creating a national standard concerning the distinctions between “excusable neglect” and “good cause” setting apart Pioneer’s 3r4 and 4th balancing factors, “the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable ili control of the movant” and whether the movant acted in good faith based on a district court’s discretion differing it from good “intervening circumstances” claims eliminating them from discretionary review where the right to file late can be readily determined not due to any fault on the part of a filer, thus providing a single rule of uniformity, including: a. Whether when a registered filer of record to a pending case, who is locked out of a district court’s Electronic Court Filing System (“ECF”) without fault of their own, and resorts to pre-ECF filing procedures timely serving a notice of appeal by email on all counsel of record and by overnight service provider on the district court clerk’s office, is the filing late barring