Whether the Due Process Clause and 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) and (B) require an evidentiary hearing

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 143 8. Ct. 1720 (2028), this Court held that a motion by the Government to dismiss a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) must be resolved by the district court pursuant to FED.R.CIv.P. 41(a). However, as Polansky notes, under Rule 41(a), a court has “no adjudicatory role,” 143 S.Ct. at 1734 n.4, but a §3730 (a)(2)(A) dismissal requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing, id., at 1734, implicating due process principles. A grant in this case is needed to give lower courts much-needed practical direction concerning the procedure to follow in applying Polansky’s command to balance Rule 41’s deferential ethic with the FCA’s and the Constitution’s due process values when confronted by a record sharply contesting the facts alleged to support the Government’s justification for dismissal. The continued viability of qui tam lawsuits depends on the practical working out of this balance sought by Polansky. The FCA also provides that a challenge to a settlement pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) requires a hearing to determine whether the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.” Unlike the instant case, Polansky did not involve a challenge pursuant to § 3730()(2)(B). The questions presented are: Whether the Due Process Clause and 31 U.S.C. § 3730(¢)(2)(A) and (B) require an evidentiary hearing when the evidence for and against dismissal is sharply conflicting at which the Relator is provided an opportunity to subpoena witnesses and to examine ii Government witnesses who have supported the motion to dismiss. Whether Relator is entitled to recover a share of funds paid by a defendant in an FCA action pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement.