Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff's motion to defer ruling on summary judgment to allow for the deposition of a convicted public official

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. In 1951 the City of Philadelphia was granted Home Rule by the Pennsylvania General Assembly. In 1951, Philadelphia used its eminent domain power to condemn a tract of land adjacent to an inlet of the Delaware River that became known as the Frankford Creek Right of Way. Confronted with evidence that defendant Robert “Bobby” Henon ,a “high ranking” public official, tried and convicted for bribery, honest services fraud and other related federal crimes, conspired with another senior public official to remove Robert Holton from adjacent contiguous real property he owned and occupied, did not the District Court abuse its discretion by denial of Holton’s motions to defer ruling upon the City’s and individual defendants’ motions for summary judgment to allow for taking of Henon’s deposition upon oral examination, after Henon abandoned his appeal from that conviction, resigned his public office, and began serving his jail sentence? 2. When Henon, then serving as a City Councilman published and distributed a press release describing with particularity acts and conduct in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy by other public officials that did not occur until five months later and could only be known if the conspiracy was planned, should not summary judgment have been denied? 3. Did not the decision and opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Knick v Township of Scott, decided during the pendency of the present action and following the District Court’s prior dismissal, reversed by the Court of Appeals, require the District Court to try the present action consistent with the ii Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, when the Taking of Holton’s property in state court occurred in February 2012, payment has not been made, and the delay is based in part on circumstances alleged in this action?