Whether non-retroactive changes in law can be 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' warranting resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

QUESTION PRESENTED This case presents a clear, recognized, and intractable circuit conflict regarding an important issue related to the implementation of the First Step Act of 2018. The First Step Act of 2018, for the first time, permitted prisoners to move for a sentence reduction under what is informally known as the “compassionate release” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Act also made transformative reductions in the minimum statutory penalties for certain crimes. See First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5220, § 401.2. Relevant here, the Act reduced the mandatory minimum sentence for petitioner’s crime of conviction from life without parole to 25 years. To be eligible for a resentencing under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a prisoner must establish that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant it. Petitioner sought resentencing on the basis of the First Step Act’s non-retroactive change in the penalty for his crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The panel acknowledged the entrenched 4-6 circuit split, but declared itself bound by Seventh Circuit precedent dictating that non-retroactive changes in law categorically cannot be “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a resentencing. That holding was and this case is a perfect vehicle for resolving the conflict over this important question. This case is an especially appropriate vehicle to resolve this question because the law in six circuits— including the Seventh—conflicts with a Sentencing Commission Guideline, set to take effect on November 1, under which petitioner is eligible for resentencing. The question presented is: Whether non-retroactive changes in law can be “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(¢)(1)(A). (i)