Whether an arbitrator may apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24 (1996), this Court delimited the “fugitive disentitlement doctrine,” an “inherent power” of “[c]ourts invested with the judicial power of the United States.” The Court explained that federal courts “have certain inherent authority to protect their proceedings,” but that “[t]he extent of these powers must be delimited with care” because “there is a danger of overreaching.” Id. at 823. Thus, while “federal courts do have authority to dismiss an appeal . . . if the party seeking relief is a fugitive while the matter is pending,” the doctrine does not “allow a court in a civil forfeiture suit to enter judgment against a claimant because he is a fugitive from ... a related criminal prosecution.” Id. at 823-24. This case is, to our knowledge, the first time the fugitive disentitlement doctrine has been applied in arbitration. The arbitrator held that Petitioner’s fugitive status from an unrelated federal criminal case permitted the arbitrator to strike Petitioner’s defenses and counterclaims and bar him from contesting Respondent’s allegations, resulting in an uncontested $56 million damages award. In affirming the judgment confirming the award, a 4-3 majority of the Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged that the use of the doctrine in the arbitration was “perhaps unprecedented.” The questions presented are: 1. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), does an arbitrator “exceed|[] [his] ii powers” by applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to disentitle a party who is a fugitive from a federal court proceeding, given the doctrine is an inherent power possessed only by courts? 2. Under the FAA, if an arbitrator may permissibly apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to protect a federal court’s proceedings, does his failure to comply with the limitations this Court set forth in Degen v. United States and other caselaw on the doctrine constitute a violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(8), (a)(4), or public policy?