Does Michigan's DNA testing statute toll the habeas limitations period?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Congress has imposed a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to seek habeas review of their conviction or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The limitations period is statutorily tolled during the pendency of a “properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” under § 2244(d)(2). A petitioner must meet two requirements for statutory tolling. First, the application must call for “judicial reexamination” of the judgment or claim, Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 553 (2011), as distinct from intermediate requests such as motions for discovery, which do not toll the limitations period, id. at 556 n.4. Second, the conforming application must be “properly filed” under state law. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). The questions presented are: 1. Does Michigan’s statute allowing a prisoner to request DNA testing call for a “judicial reexamination” of the defendant’s conviction under § 2244(d)(2) to statutorily toll the habeas limitations period, as in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, or it is more akin to a discovery request, in line with decisions from the Second, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and the Michigan appellate courts? 2. Did Petitioner Stephen Kares “properly file” his DNA motion under state law, where he did not even attempt to satisfy the minimal pleading requirements set forth in Michigan’s post-conviction DNA testing statute?