Whether the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to possess firearms notwithstanding a prior conviction for a non-violent felony-equivalent offense, and whether a federal firearms prohibition must satisfy a historical-tradition test to survive constitutional scrutiny

No question identified. : 2 The court of appeals entered its judgment on June 6, 2023. Unless extended, the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari will expire on September 5, 2023 (Tuesday following public holiday). The jurisdiction of this Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). 1. Federal law prohibits a person from possessing a firearm uv in or affecting commerce if the person has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (1). That prohibition is subject to an exception for “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a) (20) (B). In 1995, respondent Bryan David Range was convicted of making a false statement in order to obtain food stamps, in violation of 62 Pa. Ann. § 481(a). App., infra, 5a. State law classified that offense as a misdemeanor and made it punishable by up to five years of imprisonment. Ibid. As a result of that conviction, Section 922(g) (1) disqualified respondent from possessing firearms. Ibid. Respondent sued the Attorney General and the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. App., infra, 6a. He argued that Section 922(g) (1) violates his Second Amendment rights and sought declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the government from enforcing the statute against him. 3 Ibid. The district court granted the government summary judgment. Id. at 1l6la-17la. 2. A panel of the Third Circuit affirmed. App., infra, 108a-157a. The court held that “‘the people’ constitutionally entitled to bear arms are the ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ of the polity, * * * a category that properly excludes those who have demonstrated disregard for the rule of law through the commission of felony and felony-equivalent offenses, whether or not those crimes are violent.” Id. at 110a. The court also determined that “even if [respondent] falls within ‘the people,’ the Government has met its burden to demonstrate that its prohibition is consistent with historical tradition.” Ibid. 3. The court of appeals granted rehearing en banc, App., infra, 158a-159a, and then reversed and remanded, id. at la-107a. The court first concluded that, despite respondent’s conviction, he remains “one of ‘the people’ who have Second Amendment rights.” Id. at lla. It then determined that the government “ha[d] not carried its burden” of showing that “applying § 922(g) (1) to [respondent] x kK * ‘is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’” Id. at 15a. The court stated that its decision was “narrow” and that it extended only to “people like [respondent].” Id. at 22a. Judge Porter issued a concurrence arguing that state laws from the 18th and 19th centuries cannot provide appropriate historical analogues for federal firearms restrictions such as Section 922(g) (1). App., infra, 23a-29a. Judge Ambro, joined by two other judges, issued a concurrence stating that “the majority opinion * * * speaks only to [respondent’s] situation, and not to those of murderers, thieves, sex offenders, domestic abusers, and the like.” Id. at 30a; see id. at 30a-37a. Judge Shwartz, joined by one other judge, issued a dissent arguing that the en banc court’s opinion “is inconsistent with [this] Court’s jurisprudence” and that Section 922(g)(1) has “a historical basis.” Id. at 38a-39a; see id. at 38a-44a. Judge Krause issued a dissent arguing that “legislatures have historically possessed the authority to disarm entire groups, like felons, whose conduct evinces disrespect for the rule of law” and that “the doctrinal and practical ramifications” of the en banc court’s contrary decision “are profound and pernicious.” Id. at 50a; see id. at 45a-95a. Judge Roth issued a dissent arguing that, because respondent had failed to allege that the particular fir