Whether 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on individuals who receive estate property at any time after the decedent's death, or only on those who received property immediately upon the date of the decedent's death

No question identified. : APPLICATION To the Honorable Elena Kagan, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit: Pursuant to Rule 13.5 of the Rules of this Court and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), Applicant Madeleine Pickens respectfully requests a 30-day extension of time, to and including November 22, 2023, within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case. 1. The Ninth Circuit entered judgment on May 17, 2023. See United States yv. Paulson, 68 F.4th 528 (9th Cir. 2023); App. 1a-73a. The court denied Pickens’s petition for rehearing en banc on July 25, 2023. See App. 136a-138a. Unless extended, the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari will expire on October 23, 2023. This application is being filed more than ten days before a petition is currently due. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.5. The jurisdiction of this Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 2. The Applicant is Madeleine Pickens. In 2000, Pickens’s husband Allen Paulson passed away. During his lifetime, Allen transferred nearly all his assets to a living trust. The trust terms required the trustee to pay estate taxes. Allen’s son from a previous marriage—John Michael Paulson—was appointed trustee. Because Allen’s estate contained a closely-held business, the estate was statutorily eligible to enter into a 15-year payment plan. 26 U.S.C. § 6166(a)(1). In 2001, John Michael Paulson elected to pay estate taxes through a payment plan. But the government neither required John Michael Paulson to post a surety bond, nor imposed a special lien, all of which it could do to protect its interest. Because of extraordinary misconduct by John Michael Paulson—for which Pickens is not responsible—the estate later failed to pay the taxes. See App. 9a-10a, 114a-115a. 3. In 2003, nearly three years after her husband’s death, Pickens received property from the trust. Pickens then had no further engagement with the trust. In 2009, the trust defaulted under the payment plan. At that time, the trust had enough money to pay the taxes. The government assessed the trust’s outstanding tax liability at $9.6 million and valued the estate’s assets at $13.7 million. In 2010, the IRS terminated the trust’s payment plan. Meanwhile, a state probate court dismissed John Michael Paulson from his position as trustee for misconduct. When the dust settled, two other heirs had become co-trustees. In 2013, the new trustees claimed the trust had been completely depleted. See App. 11a-12a, 115a-117a. 4. In 2015, the government filed this action seeking to hold Pickens personally liable under 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) for the estate’s outstanding taxes, an amount in excess of $10 million. Every court to consider Section 6324 since it was enacted in 1954 has read the statute to prohibit such personal liability, because Section 6324 imposes liability only on individuals who held or received estate property “immediately upon the date of decedent’s death.” App. 129a. Applying that settled understanding, the District Court concluded that someone like Pickens who received estate property after the decedent’s death cannot be held personally liable for estate taxes. Instead, the District Court held that a person like Pickens can be held personally liable only if she “received property immediately upon the date of decedent’s death.” Id. 5. Over Judge Ikuta’s dissent, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. The majority—the first court to ever do so—held that “§ 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes” on persons who receive estate property “either on the date of the decedent’s death or at anytime thereafter.” App. 16a (emphasis added). To reach this result, the majority relied on the last-antecedent canon, the interpretive principle that a limiting clause ordinarily modifies “only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” App.