Gina Russomanno v. Sunovion Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al.
Whether a district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without providing a curative remedy constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion that renders the judgment void and warrants extraordinary relief
No question identified. : Case No.[ J]; Linked to Certiorari [ IX ], and to Extension [23A158] STATEMENT OF APPLICATION Pro Se Petitioner, Gina Russomanno, makes this Application to Individual Justice, Samuel Alito, 3"4 Circuit Supreme Court Justice, who has the discretionary and supervisory power to grant relief sought in this Case, from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Case No. [23-8013], as it pertains, in Link, to USSC Certiorari Case, [~/ ; entered this US Supreme Court, simultaneously, under an extension, until November 6, 2023. Petitioner sought a Stay on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals Case [23-8013], motion entered June 1, 2023, and denied on July 25, 2023; Petitioner enters this USSC Application to Individual Justices per Rules 22 and 23 to Suspend judgement and Stay Case [23-8013]. Petitioner files this appeal to Individual Justice Samuel Alito, Third Circuit Justice, from this Third Circuit Court of Appeals case, arising from NJ District Court of the Third Circuit, with no other alternative form for remedy or relief. Case No.[ —_]; Linked to Certiorari [ ], and to Extension [23A158] Petitioner has also simultaneously filed a Writ of ar (23 5 Certiorari, herein this Court Case No. Plaintiff appealed directly to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Case No. [23-8013], by F.R.A.P Rule 5(a)(1)-(3): Petition for Permission to Appeal, and per FRCP Rule 60(b)(6), Rule 60(d)(1), and Rule 54(b). (1) To request permission to appeal when an appeal is within the court of appeals’ discretion, a party must file a petition with the circuit clerk and serve it on all other parties to the district-court action. (8) If a party cannot petition for appeal unless the district court first enters an order granting permission to do so or stating that the necessary conditions are met, the district court may amend its order, either on its own or in response to a party's motion, to include the required permission or statement. In that event, the time to petition runs from entry of the amended order. Plaintiff requested permission to appeal, DCNJ Case No. [3:19-cv-05945], Whereby, the Decision Opinion [Dkt 61, 62] was “absent adequate remedy of law.” Pro Se Plaintiff was “never provided ‘Any Provisional Form’ of the Mandate Law Standard in ‘Curative Remedy for Amendment upon a Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal Action, per Case No.[ —_]; Linked to Certiorari [ ], and to Extension [23A158] [Phillips v. Allegheny]; and multiple other standard case law, to support. That “absence of adequate remedy of law” in the OpinionDecision at [Dkt. 61 & 62] of DCNJ, case [3:19-cv-05945], is an ‘indisputable element’ in “abuse of discretion.” Thereby, the judgement is manifestly unconscionable and the judgement is void. See: [Barrett, 840 F.2d at 1268 (citing11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Practice and Procedure § 2868 at 238 (1973)]; et.al. The Mandate for “Curative Remedy Action,” upon a “Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal Action” is a “Binding Authority” for these Courts to must provide. Thereby, 1. There is a “reasonable probability” that four Justices will grant certiorari, or agree to review the merits of the case; 2. that there is a “fair prospect” that a majority of the Court will conclude upon review that the decision below on the merits was erroneous; 3. that irreparable harm will result from the denial of the stay; 4. finally, the Circuit Justice may find it appropriate to balance 3 Case No.[{ —_ J; Linked to Certiorari [ ], and to Extension [23A158] the equities, exploring the relative harms to the applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large. It is likely more than Four Justices will find that the Dismissal Action in the DCNJ [8:19-cv-05945], [Dkt. 61] cannot “officially stand;” wherein, there is an ‘indisputable element’ in “abuse of discretion” by the “absence of adequate remedy of law.” The Dismissal-Opinion does not demonstrate “any statement provisions whatsoever in providing plaintiff curative remedy on a Rule 12(b)(6)