Whether the Supreme Court should clarify the standards for standing and mootness in educational disability rights cases involving administrative exhaustion under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)

No question identified. : To the Honorable Ketanji Brown Jackson, as Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: The Petitioners, NANCY ROE, as parent and natural guardian of A.R., and Individually, AMY MARANVILLE, as parent and natural guardian of P.M., and Individually, and MARIA POPOVA, as parent and natural guardian of S.P., and Individually, under Supreme Court Rule 13(5), request a 60-day extension to petition for a writ of certiorari. This request, if granted, would extend the deadline from November 12, 2023, to January 11, 2024. Petitioners will ask this Court to review a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, issued on August 14, 2023 (attached hereto as Exhibit 1), which affirmed the dismissal of Petitioners’ putative class action Complaint against MAURA TRACY HEALEY, in her official capacity as Governor (now CHARLIE BAKER), MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, BROOKLINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SOMERVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, WELLESLEY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, JEFFREY C. RILEY, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Education, DR. LINUS J. GUILLORY, JR., in his official capacity as Superintendent of Brookline Public Schools, MARY E. SKIPPER, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Somerville Public Schools, and DR. DAVID LUSSIER, in his capacity as Superintendent of Wellesley Public Schools. The First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss and deny Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction was denied because the District Court found that a switch to virtual learning was not a change in the students’ education placement by virtue of being a system-side change that applied to all students. It also hinted that Plaintiffs did not have standing because they lacked sufficiently imminent and substantial harm, reasoning that schools likely would not close again. The First Circuit reviewed Plaintiffs’ claim that the District Court erred in dismissing the request for a preliminary injunction but found that the request was moot because a final judgment was entered. The First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing based on a two-fold inquiry into each claim asserted and for each form of relief sought with respect to Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims. The First Circuit held that: (1) Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief did not allege harm which was sufficiently imminent and substantial; (2) Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief, specifically a declaration that their education placement is in-person learning, is not supported by the hypothetical sequence of events which would have to occur to revert to virtual learning; and, (8) Plaintiffs’ alleged past injury due to the COVID-related closures of school and subsequent virtual learning model cannot support standing for either an injunction or declaratory relief. The First Circuit then independently considered mootness, finding that no Plaintiff was currently enrolled in any of the three defendant school districts and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied, as the Court was unable to provide any relief to the Plaintiffs since there was no ongoing conduct to enjoin and declaratory judgment would be advisory in nature. However, the First Circuit also noted that recovery was possible for past harm, should redress be requested. The inquiry next turned to relief for past violations under the IDEA and associated regulations, section 504, the ADA, and the 14tt Amendment per section 1983. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of these claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as remedies allowable by the IDEA were the only ones requested and all claims were precipitated by the denial of FAPE and found that no exception to exhaustion would apply. The Court held that the futility exception to exhaustion could not