Erica Davis, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Andrew Dale Davis, Deceased, and Minor Children, JC, Minor Child, SD, Minor Child, et al. v. Cranfield Aerospace Solutions, Limited
Arbitration DueProcess
Whether continuous supervision and management of a forum-state business's activities through a multi-year contract constitutes purposeful availment sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause
No question identified. : BACKGROUND This case raises an important question about the degree of connection between an out-of-forum business and a forum required to establish purposeful availment under this Court’s personal jurisdiction precedents. Here, respondent Cranfield Aerospace Solutions, located in the United Kingdom, acted as a contractor and agent for Tamarack Aerospace Group, Inc., an aviation business with its principal place of business in Idaho. App. 7a. Tamarack hired Cranfield to help obtain required regulatory approvals to manufacture and sell an aviation part called the ATLAS system. Id. Thus, Cranfield contracted with Tamarack; Cranfield sent employees to visit Tamarack on two occasions—once to kick off the performance of the contract by meeting the engineers to learn about the system, observing a prototype, and planning the certification process together with Tamarack, and a second time to approve Tamarack’s testing procedures for the ATLAS at a critical stage of the project; Cranfield supervised Tamarack’s testing of the ATLAS; Cranfield prepared the relevant applications in consultation with Tamarack; and Cranfield then held the resulting certifications for Tamarack’s benefit, effectively allowing Tamarack to manufacture and sell the ATLAS in Idaho. Id. at 14a-19a, 24a-32a. When the ATLAS caused a crash that killed petitioners’ family members, petitioners sued Cranfield in Idaho asserting various tort claims. Id. at 8a. Following jurisdictional discovery, the district court granted Cranfield’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Davis v. Cranfield Aerospace Sols. Ltd., 2022 WL 36488 (D. Idaho Jan. 4, 2022). The court reasoned that because Tamarack had sought Cranfield out, and because Cranfield performed most of its work in the United Kingdom, Cranfield had not purposefully availed itself of Idaho and could not be sued there. See id. at *6-7. A sharply divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a precedential opinion. Consistent with the district court’s decision, the court of appeals determined that Cranfield had not reached into Idaho to initiate the contractual relationship, and found all of Cranfield’s contacts with Idaho insufficient to constitute purposeful availment. For example, even though the contract contemplated that Cranfield would have access to Tamarack’s Idaho facility “as and when necessary” in order to “witness’ any tests associated with the project,” the Ninth Circuit held that this was irrelevant because it was “permissive—not mandatory—and does not specify whether Cranfield must ‘witness’ any tests in person.” App. 15a-16a. Similarly, the court of appeals found it irrelevant that Cranfield’s employees twice visited Tamarack in Idaho pursuant to the contract, determining that because these trips “did not suggest a ‘special place’ in Cranfield’s years-long performance of its contract,” they were “too attenuated to establish minimum contacts with the State.” Jd. at 19a (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit’s decision provoked a sharp dissent, which argued that petitioners had “lopsidedly carried [their] burden by showing that Cranfield undertook continuing obligations entailing substantial activity directed toward Tamarack ...in Idaho for over six years.” App. 21a. As the dissent explained, Cranfield’s contracts “required it to ‘oversee’ Tamarack in their ‘work together to draft ? and finalize’ two ‘deliverables,” such that “the two companies partnered—with Cranfield acting as the senior partner because it would ‘oversee’ the junior partner’s work in Idaho.” Id. at 27a (quoting the record). After those deliverables were completed, the contract required Cranfield to apply for the relevant certifications, and then “to hold{] and/or maintain[]’ the certification—a valuable right—‘for Tamarack’s benefit.” Id. at 28a (quoting the record). While Cranfield held that certification, its “approval was necessary for Tamarack to install the ATLAS system on any aircraft.” Id