Jill L. Stein, et al. v. Federal Election Commission
Whether Section 9032(6) of the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act violates the Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily terminating minor party candidates' public campaign funding eligibility based on major party convention dates
No question identified. : TO THE HONORABLE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 13.5, Applicants Dr. Jill Stein and Jill Stein for President (together, “Stein”) respectfully request a 60-day extension of time, to and including January 28, 2024, in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals entered its judgment on July 21, 2023. See Stein v. Federal Election Commission, No. 21-1213 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2023) (attached as Exhibit A). On August 31, 2023, the Court of Appeals denied Stein’s petition for rehearing en banc. See Order, Stein v. Federal Election Commission, No. 21-1213 (D.C. Cir. August 31, 2023) (attached as Exhibit B). Unless extended, the time in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari will expire on November 29, 2023. The jurisdiction of this Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 1. This case raises an issue of exceptional importance — whether Section 9032(6) of the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act (“the Act”), see 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-42, is unconstitutional because it invidiously discriminates against minor party candidates. This question is exceptionally important because it implicates the constitutionality of the federal statute that establishes the public financing scheme applicable to all candidates for President of the United States. Further, the resolution of this question will determine whether the public financing scheme established by the Act remains viable as applied to minor party candidates in future election cycles. 2. Under Section 9032(6), all candidates become ineligible to receive matching funds no later than the last date of the major parties’ conventions. See 26 U.S.C. § 9032(6). This provision applies to minor party candidates even if they continue to incur ballot access costs that otherwise qualify for funding under the Act, and notwithstanding the express conclusion of the Federal Election Commission (“the Commission”) that “the petition process required of the presidential candidates of the minor parties [is] the equivalent of the primary elections and convention process of the major party candidates.” AO 1975-44, at 2 (Socialist Workers 1976). As a result, Section 9032(6) guarantees that major party candidates are eligible for funding during the entire length of their primary election campaigns, but terminates a minor party candidate’s eligibility for funding in the midst of theirs whenever the major parties happen to hold early nomination conventions. 3. The arbitrary termination date imposed by Section 9032(6) produces disparate results that serve no legitimate governmental interest. In 2012, for example, Stein ran for President, qualified for matching funds under the Act and remained eligible to receive them for the duration of her primary election campaign because the major parties held their conventions in September. No repayment order issued. In 2016, by contrast, Stein again ran for President and qualified for matching funds under the Act, but her eligibility to receive them terminated in the midst of her primary election campaign because the major parties held their conventions in August. This led the Commission to enter the $175,272.00 Repayment Order at issue in this case. See Stein v. Federal Election Commission, No. 21-1213 (July 21, 2023) (“Panel Opinion”) (attached as Exhibit C). 4. The Court of Appeals incorrectly rejected Stein’s Equal Protection challenge to Section 9032(6) on the ground that “the public funding limits at issue are indistinguishable from those upheld in Buckley.” Panel Opinion at 7 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).) But Stein did not challenge the Act’s public funding limits and they are not “at issue” in this case. The Court of Appeals did not even address