Whether the Eighth Amendment requires resentencing or individualized review for juvenile offenders sentenced to mandatory life without the possibility of parole before Miller v. Alabama

No question identified. : APPLICATION To the Honorable Elena Kagan, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Pursuant to Rule 13.5 of the Rules of this Court and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), Applicant Lonnie Allen Bassett respectfully requests a 45-day extension of time, to and including January 31, 2024, within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court in this case. 1. The Arizona Supreme Court entered judgment on September 18, 2023. See State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper, 535 P.3d 3 (Ariz. 2023). App. la-22a. Unless extended, the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari will expire on December 18, 2023. This application is being filed more than ten days before a petition is currently due. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.5. The jurisdiction of this Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). 2. The Applicant is Lonnie Allen Bassett. Mr. Bassett was 16 years old when he fatally shot two people in 2004. The State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty was struck after this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibit[s] the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles.” Roper v. Simmons, 5438 U.S. 551, 570571 (2005). Mr. Bassett was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. 3. During the period relevant here, Arizona provided two alternatives to a death sentence for defendants convicted of first-degree murder—‘natural life,” under which a defendant was categorically ineligible for “commutation, parole, * * * or release from confinement on any basis,” and “life,” which required a defendant to serve at least 25 years before he could be eligible for “release[] on any basis.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(A) (2004); see Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-703.01(A) (2005), 13-1105(D) (2005). A separate provision of Arizona law, however, abolished parole for felons as of January 1, 1994. See App. 8a-9a; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1604.09(1)(1) (1994); Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 6138, 614 (2016) (“Under Arizona law, ‘parole is available only to individuals who committed a felony before January 1, 1994.’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, defendants in Arizona who committed their offense during the relevant period were ineligible for parole, meaning that their “only option would have been ‘release’ after twenty-five years through the executive clemency process.” App. 9a; see also Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U.S. 17, 21 (2023). 4. When Mr. Bassett was sentenced in 2006, the sentencing judge had no option to choose a sentence that would have allowed for parole. See App. 8a (acknowledging that “Bassett was actually ineligible for parole”); see also State v. Wagner, 510 P.3d 1083, 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022) (“Because parole had been abolished for those who committed felonies as of January 1, 1994, the superior court’s sentencing options for the murder conviction were limited to * * * life imprisonment with no release for the rest of [the defendant’s] natural life, or life imprisonment with the possibility of release through executive clemency after [the defendant] served 25 years.”), review continued (Sept. 12, 2023). 5. The trial court sentenced Mr. Bassett to “natural life,” rendering him categorically ineligible for “commutation, parole, * * * or release from confinement on any basis.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(A) (2004); see App. 8a. The trial court also imposed an additional consecutive life sentence. App. 8a. Both convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. 6. In 2012, this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). This Court identified “29 jurisdictions mandating life without parole for children’—including Arizona. Id. at 486 & n.13. 7. In 2016, this Court reiterated Miller’s holding that “mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for children pose too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” and held that Miller app