Whether the Powell factors governing IRS summons enforcement require strict compliance with the requirement that sought information not already be in the IRS's possession

No question identified. : 2. This case presents multiple important and recurring questions concerning the scope of courts’ authority to enforce IRS summonses. Under this Court’s longstanding precedent, courts may enforce a summons only if the IRS has “demonstrate[d] good faith in issuing the summons.” United States v. Clarke, 573 U.S. 248, 250 (2014) (cleaned up). “[TJhat means establishing what have become known as the Powell factors: ‘(1] that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, [2] that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, [3] that the information sought is not already within the IRS’ possession, and [4] that the administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code have been followed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964)). Further, the party opposing an IRS summons is “entitled” to an evidentiary hearing to probe the summons’ validity if he “can point to specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of bad faith,” “improper purpose,” or another basis to impugn the summons. Id. at 254. Here, the IRS petitioned to enforce a summons for documents issued to applicant’s Frank Agrama, who died after oral argument was heard in the Ninth Circuit. In the district court, Agrama responded that the summons should not be enforced under the Powell test for several reasons. First, the IRS admittedly already possesses many of the summoned documents, thus failing to make a prima facie showing of the third Powell requirement. Second, the summons was issued in bad faith, and its enforcement would abuse judicial process, because it serves an investigation whose current scope or focus is tainted by the IR&’s reliance on an expert report—the Chersicla Report—that was prepared for Italian prosecutors based on information they obtained through the FBI’s unconstitutional search of Mr. Agrama’s home and office in Los Angeles. And third, the summons was issued in bad faith also because it was designed to circumvent disclosure prohibitions in multiple Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”) between Italy and other countries, and therefore enforcement would abuse judicial process and breach the principle of international comity. In the alternative, Agrama argued that, under Clarke, he was at a minimum entitled to an evidentiary hearing to investigate the summons’ validity with respect to each of the defects just identified. 3. The district court denied Agrama’s motion for a hearing and granted the IRS's petition to enforce the summons. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on grounds that contradict decisions of this Court and other circuits on multiple important issues. App. A. 4. First, notwithstanding the IRS’s “conce[ssion] that it already possesses some of the material covered by the summons,” the court of appeals concluded that the IRS had satisfied the third Powell requirement because there is “no evidence” that the summons was “designed to ‘harass”” Agrama. App. A at 4. The Ninth Circuit explained that the third Powell requirement should not be taken literally, but rather “serves to prohibit the issuance of unnecessary summonses that are designed to harass the taxpayer or that otherwise abuse the court’s process.” Jd. (cleaned up). In Powell and again in Clarke, however, this Court expressly stated that an IRS summons could be enforced only if “the information sought is not already within the IRS’ possession,” and expressly treated harassment as a separate ground for invalidating an IRS summons. Powell, 379 USS. at 56-58; Clarke, 573 U.S. at 250-251. Thus, the court of appeals collapsed the "not already possessed” requirement into the separate “not designed to harass” requirement, disregarding this Court’s dictate that when it comes to this Court’s decisions, “what they say and what they mean are one and the same.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 514 (2016). The Ninth Circuit’s approach widens confusion among the circuits about the meaning of the third