No. 23A534

Jay Hymas, dba Dosmen Farms v. Department of Interior

Lower Court: Ninth Circuit
Docketed: 2023-12-12
Status: Presumed Complete
Type: A
Experienced Counsel
Tags: civil-litigation court-fees filing-fees in-forma-pauperis judicial-discretion statutory-interpretation
Latest Conference: N/A
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) permits district courts to impose partial filing fees on non-prisoner civil litigants or requires complete fee waiver

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

No question identified. : 1. This case presents a significant question of law—namely, whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), district courts may impose a partial filing fee on in forma pauperis civil litigants, or instead must waive entirely the $350 filing fee statutorily set by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). This recurring question has divided lower federal courts. Compare Garza v. Thaler, 585 F.3d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that district court could not impose partial filing fees because the Fifth Circuit could “not find any authority that authorizes a district court to grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a § 2254 case [which is not subject to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)], and yet require payment of appellate filing fees pursuant to the [partial filing fee] provisions of the PLRA”), with Samarripa v. Ormond, 917 F.3d 515, 516 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that “district court [has] discretion to require partial prepayment of appellate filing fees” under PLRA); Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that “district courts have the authority to impose partial filing fees on non-prisoner civil litigants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)”). 2. Unlike the decision below, Petitioner’s position is consistent with the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and § 1915(a)(1), which do not afford district courts discretion to impose a partial filing fee. Sections 1914(a)-(b) require a $350 filing fee as well as fees, such as the $52 administrative fee for filing a civil lawsuit, prescribed by the Judicial Conference. Section 1915(a)(1) then gives district courts limited discretion to waive payment of those specific, statutory fees as a condition precedent to filing suit: “[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor.” (Emphasis added.) “[W]ithout prepayment of fees” is clear—a court may permit a litigant to proceed without paying any fees. Use of the plural “fees” indicates an all or nothing choice; the district court may allow a litigant to commence suit with payment of the statutorily required fees or “without” them. What the court may not do under § 1915(a)(1) is engage in fee setting by ordering a civil litigant to pay a portion of the required fee amount, as the district court did here, or impose an installment payment plan with an initial downpayment. Sections 1915(b) and (c) further support this reading. Section 1915(b), which applies only to prisoners, provides that a prisoner bringing a civil action “shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee” and that the “court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (b)(2) then provides that, “[a]fter payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make [specified] monthly payments” until “the filing fees are paid.” § 1915(b)(2) (emphasis added). Subsections (b)(3)-(4) then state that “[i]Jn no event shall” (i) “the filing fee collected exceed the amount of fees permitted by statute for the commencement of a civil action” or (ii) “a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action” for inability to pay the “initial partial filing fee.” § 1915(b)(3)-(4) (emphases added). Section 1915(b) thus uses the word “partial” four times and distinguishes 6, among a “filing fee,” “any court fees,” and “fees permitted by statute for the commencement of a civil action.” If Congress intended § 1915(a)(1) to afford district courts discretion to require partial fee payments, or to waive particular fees but not others, § 1915(b) shows that Congress knew how to do so clearly. Likewise, § 1915(c) provides that, “[u]pon the filing of an affidavit in accordance with subsections (a) and (b) and the prepay

Docket Entries

2023-12-12
Application (23A534) granted by Justice Kagan extending the time to file until February 18, 2024.
2023-12-08
Application (23A534) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from December 20, 2023 to February 18, 2024, submitted to Justice Kagan.

Attorneys

Jay Hymas
Michael Anthony ScodroMayer Brown LLP, Petitioner
Michael Anthony ScodroMayer Brown LLP, Petitioner
United States Department of Interior
Elizabeth B. PrelogarSolicitor General, Respondent
Elizabeth B. PrelogarSolicitor General, Respondent