Whether Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against former employees with respect to post-employment benefits earned during their tenure

No question identified. : for employees that retired for qualifying disability reasons until the age of 65. And because Ms. Stanley’s Parkinson’s disease was a qualifying disability, she continued on the city’s health insurance with the city’s retiree health insurance subsidy. Unbeknownst to her, however, the city had changed its policy to limit the retiree health insurance subsidy for disability retirees to just twenty-four months. Ms. Stanley was never made aware of this policy change while she was working for the city. 3. Under the city’s new policy, Ms. Stanley was set to lose her health insurance at the end of 2020. So, in April 2020, she filed suit to maintain her entitlement to the cityprovided health insurance subsidy until the age of 65. Her complaint alleged that the city’s policy change discriminated against her on the basis of her disability under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 4, The district court dismissed Ms. Stanley’s claim on the basis of circuit precedent and, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals recognized that the ADA “protects against discrimination in fringe benefits, such as health insurance.” Stanley v. City of Sanford, 83 F Ath 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2023). But the court found itself bound by its earlier precedent holding that “a former employee who does not hold or desire to hold an employment position cannot sue over discriminatory postemployment benefits.” Jd. at 1337 (citing Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996)). The court determined that this Court’s decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), which held that an individual could sue a former employer under Title VII for a post-employment act, did not compel a different result. In Robinson, this Court explained that because “sections of [Title VII] plainly contemplate that former employees will make use of the remedial mechanisms of Title VII,” the term “employees” “includes former employees.” 519 U.S. at 339, 345. 5. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Ms. Stanley’s argument that the court’s prior precedent in Gonzales had been abrogated by recent amendments to the text of the ADA. Among other things, the court held that Gonzales survives the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act’s modification of Title I to provide that an employer’s liability accrues whenever an individual “is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision,” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(3)(A); see Stanley, 83 F.4th at 1342. 6. The court, however, “acknowledge[d] that the circuits are split,” and that its decision “aligns [] with the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.” Stanley, 83 F.4th at 1341. The court explained that those circuits similarly found that “(1) Robinson does not implicate Title I’s anti-discrimination provision and (2) Title I does not protect people who neither held nor desired a job with the defendant at the time of discrimination.” Jd. The court recognized that, on the other side of the split, the “Second and Third Circuits” read Title I’s anti-discrimination provision “in favor of former employees” on this issue. Jd. The court also recognized that a prior panel of the Eleventh Circuit, in Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 281 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2002), had agreed with the holding of the Second and Third Circuits. That decision, however, had been vacated when the full court set the issue for rehearing en banc and the case settled before the rehearing could take place. 7. This case thus presents an acknowledged circuit split, as well as a conflict between the reasoning in the decision below and this Court’s precedent, over an important question of statutory construction: Does Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability with respect to benefits earned during an employee’s tenure but distributed post-employment? 8. Ms. Stanley respectfully requests a 60-day extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari se