Whether a school district has an affirmative obligation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act's stay-put provision to implement a student's individualized education program when the existing placement becomes unavailable

in this case is whether and to what extent a school district has obligations under the stay-put provision when a student’s existing placement becomes unavailable. The circuits are divided on this question. Some courts have held that a school district has no affirmative obligation under Section 1415G) when a student’s existing placement becomes unavailable. Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 335 F.3d 297, 301-02 (4th Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., Weil v. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 931 F.2d 1069, 1072-73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 910 (1991); Tilton ex rel. Richards v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 800, 804-05 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984). Other courts, however, have recognized that a school district must implement the student’s IEP “as closely as possible” in such circumstances. John M. ex rel. Christine M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Evanston Twp. High Sch. Dist. 202, 502 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 927 F.3d 1203, 1213-15 (11th Cir. 2019). In this case, the D.C. Circuit staked out a third position. The court first concluded that, contrary to the statute’s text, the stay-put provision does not apply if the school district does not “control” the placement’s unavailability. App. A at 11-13. The court then concluded that, even if the stay-put provision applied, if a “similar” placement is not available, the school district has no obligation under the stay-put provision to implement the IEP “as closely as possible.” Id. at 14-15. The proper interpretation of Section 1415(j) is unquestionably important, and the circuit division is intolerable. The stay-put provision is a vital component of the IDEA’s framework, as it reflects an “unequivocal” mandate by Congress for school districts to preserve the status quo, ensuring students receive necessary education services and providing certainty to both school districts and parents. Honig, 484 U.S. at 323; see Olu-Cole, 930 F.3d at 523 (stay-put provision “strikes the balance heavily in favor of maintaining the educational status quo for students with disabilities”). The split in the lower courts over how this provision applies in the case of placement unavailability undermines those objectives and warrants this Court’s review. 2. This case squarely presents the question of whether and how the stayput provision applies. The case was brought by Anne Davis on behalf of her son, Braeden Davis, who qualifies for services under the IDEA. Braeden’s IEP specifies that his educational placement is a residential treatment center. Braeden was initially enrolled at Community Services for Autistic Adults and Children (CSAAC), a private residential and educational institution. In 2021, however, he was unilaterally discharged from CSAAC, and the District failed to place him in a similar educational placement.