DueProcess
Whether the use of scientifically unreliable forensic DNA evidence that was concededly false and misleading violates a criminal defendant's constitutional right to due process
No question identified. : Background 1. Petitioner Areli Escobar was convicted of capital murder in May 2011, and the trial court set punishment at death pursuant to the jury’s answers to special issues submitted under Texas law. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Escobar v. State, No. AP-76,571 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2013) (not designated for publication). His initial application for habeas corpus in state court was subsequently denied. Mr. Escobar’s trial convictions were obtained largely based on DNA evidence that was presented to the jury. But in June 2016, the Austin Police DNA lab—the lab that conducted the DNA testing in Mr. Escobar’s case, and the lab whose employees testified to the jury about the soundness of the DNA evidence presented to the jury— suspended operations after an independent audit conducted by the Texas Forensic Science Commission uncovered grave issues that called into serious question the reliability of the lab’s work. Based in part on these newly discovered issues, Mr. Escobar filed a second state habeas application, raising six claims related to the closure of the DNA lab, scientific developments pertaining both to DNA testing and latent fingerprint analysis, and issues related to the cell tower and cell phone record evidence presented at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas (CCA) agreed that these claims raised serious questions, so it remanded the case to the state habeas trial court for further proceedings on five of the six claims presented in the application. The state habeas trial court held an evidentiary hearing and considered voluminous record evidence, and on December 31, 2020, recommended granting relief. In relevant part, the state habeas trial court found that the DNA evidence the State relied on and the testimony from the lab’s experts that was presented to support that evidence was scientifically unreliable, false, and misleading. App. B, infra, at 1-2 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dec. 31, 2020)). The trial court found that the evidence was critical to the case, and that it was more likely than not that without it, the State would not have secured a conviction against Mr. Escobar. Id. at 61-62. Thus, the trial court concluded, the State’s use of the false, misleading, and unreliable DNA evidence violated Mr. Escobar’s constitutional rights to due process under both the state and federal Constitutions, and the court found that Mr. Escobar was entitled to habeas relief. Id. at 62-64. The State agreed with the district court’s factual conclusion that the DNA evidence was unreliable, false, and misleading, and also with the finding that Mr. Escobar was entitled to relief on his due process claim because a jury would more likely than not have found that the State failed to meet its prosecutorial burden without that evidence. All agreed—the state habeas trial court, Mr. Escobar, and the State—that the “State’s use of unreliable, false, or misleading DNA evidence to secure Mr. Escobar’s conviction violated fundamental concepts of justice” and “Mr. Escobar’s right to due process as guaranteed by the United States and Texas Constitutions.” Id. at 64. Despite the agreement of the prosecution, Mr. Escobar, and the state habeas trial court, the CCA denied Mr. Escobar’s application for habeas relief in a short, unpublished opinion that did not even mention the State’s concession that Mr. Escobar is entitled to habeas relief. See App. A. 2. After the state appellate court denied relief, Mr. Escobar filed a pro se suggestion for reconsideration that the court denied. For its part, the State also filed a suggestion for reconsideration, which the State noted was “an unusual move,” but which was warranted in the unusual posture of this application, because the “State has conceded that” Mr. Escobar “is entitled to relief.” App. C, infra, at 1-2 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the State suggested that the CCA “file and set the