Whether federal common law or state law governs climate-change tort claims seeking redress for interstate greenhouse gas emissions after the Clean Air Act's displacement of federal common law

is whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate. This Court’s decisions establish that federal law necessarily and exclusively supplies the rule of decision for certain narrow categories of claims that implicate “uniquely federal interests,” including where “the interstate or international nature of the controversy makes it inappropriate for state law to control.” Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-641 (1981) (citation omitted). The Court has thus long held that, when claims “deal with air and water in their 7 ambient or interstate aspects,” federal common law presumptively governs, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972), and “state law cannot be used,” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 n.7 (1981). But as the Court held in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), “any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil fuel[s]” has been “displace[d]” by “the Clean Air Act and EPA actions it authorizes.” Id. at 424. As the Hawaii Supreme Court acknowledged, courts are divided as to whether state law governs climate-change claims after the displacement of any federal-common-law cause of action by the Clean Air Act. App., infra, 5la n.9, 58a-59a. In City of New York v. Chevron Corporation, 993 F.3d 81 (2021), the Second Circuit held that “state law does not suddenly become presumptively competent to address issues that demand a unified federal standard simply because Congress saw fit to displace a federal court-made standard with a legislative one.” Id. at 98. Similarly, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (1984), the Seventh Circuit held that state law could not govern disputes concerning interstate water pollution after the Clean Water Act displaced the previous body of federal law governing such disputes. Id. at 410-411. In the decision below, however, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that state law could govern plaintiffs’ climate-change claims, despite the inherently federal nature of claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by interstate and international emissions. App., infra, 54a-59a. That decision not only creates a circuit conflict but is also inconsistent with International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), where this Court held that the Clean Water Act preempts claims seeking remedies under the common law of one State for injuries allegedly caused by a source of pollution located in another State. Id. at 494-97. The second question presented is whether the Constitution permits a State to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over claims against nonresident defendants based on injuries allegedly caused by out-of-state marketing activities and global fossil-fuel consumption. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “limits a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). This Court’s precedents establish that a State may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s in-state contacts v and the exercise of jurisdiction is “reasonable[] in the context of our federal system.” Id. at 1024, 1025. In the proceedings below, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a Hawaii court had specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendants with respect to claims alleging that the defendants’ out-ofstate marketing activities resulted in increased global fossilfuel consumption, which resulted in increased global greenhousegas emissions, which contributed to global climate change, which re