Whether a federal appellate court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review a district court's threshold determination that a Rule 60(b) motion in a habeas case is not a 'true' Rule 60(b) motion and should be treated as an unauthorized successive habeas petition

No question identified. : the Petition due on March 21, 2024. Respondent’s counsel, Assistant Oklahoma Attorney General Joshua Lockett, has informed undersigned counsel that he has no objection to this requested 45-day extension. Mr. Wood seeks review of the Tenth Circuit’s Order in Wood v. Quick, No. 286134 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 2023) (App. 1) dismissing for lack of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 Mr. Wood’s timely appeal of the district court’s decision that his Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) (hereafter “Rule 60(b)” Motion) was not a “true” Rule 60(b) Motion, but rather an unauthorized habeas petition (App. 2). Mr. Wood argued below (App. 3) that the Tenth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court’s decision that his Rule 60(b) Motion was “not a true Rule 60(b) motion” (App. 2 at 6-7), because that decision terminated the litigation on the merits of Mr. Wood’s Rule 60(b) Motion in the district court, rendering it final and appealable under a straightforward reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and this Court’s precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United State[] . . .”); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (“A ‘final decision’ generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”). The Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that because the district court decided in the same order, first, that Mr. Wood’s Rule 60(b) Motion was “not a true Rule 60(b) motion” (App. 2 at 6-7), and, then, on that basis, transferred it to the Tenth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 for adjudication as a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)2, it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s threshold Rule 60(b) determination (App. 1 at 1-2 (Tenth Circuit concluding that “this court lacks jurisdiction to review, via this appeal, the district court’s conclusion that Wood’s Rule 60 motion was an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition[]”)). REASONS FOR THE REQUESTED EXTENSION OF TIME Mr. Wood seeks this Court’s review of the Tenth Circuit’s decision that it lacks appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court’s decision that Mr. Wood’s Rule 60(b) Motion was “not a true Rule 60(b) motion” (App. 2 at 6— 7), simply because, later in the same order, the district court also transferred the matter to the Tenth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 for adjudication as a second-orsuccessive habeas application requiring authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (App. 2 at 7). The 28 U.S.C. § 1631 transfer procedure that the Tenth Circuit has adopted for district courts adjudicating Rule 60(b) Motions in federal habeas cases renders the Tenth Circuit an outlier among lower federal courts tasked with adjudicating Rule 60(b) motions in habeas cases. See Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 2 That transferred case is captioned In re: Tremane Wood, No. 23-6129 (10th Cir.). There, Mr. Wood argued in a Motion for Remand that the district court erred in construing his Rule 60(b) Motion as “not a true Rule 60(b) motion” under this Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), and asked the Tenth Circuit to remand his case to the district court for adjudication of the merits of his Rule 60(b) Motion. (App. 4.) 12138, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (directing that where, in a habeas case, a “district court concludes that the [Rule 60(b)] motion is actually a second or successive petition, it should refer the matter to this court for authorization under § 2244(b)(8)[]” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631)). The Tenth Circuit’s procedure, together with its decision below that it lacks appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s Rule 60(b) decision because it adopted that procedure in Mr. Wood’s case, also has serious implications for the availability of appe