Whether Apple's digital software distribution practices on the iPhone constitute an unlawful tying arrangement in violation of antitrust law

. Given the Ninth Circuit’s overt failure to address the pernicious tying of digital software distribution stores to the iPhone device by Apple Inc., does proper adjudication substantiate the granting of an immediate writ of injunction pursuant to the per se antitrust rule for tying arrangements established in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)? . Does the Ninth Circuit’s oversight of notary stamps as a form of modern-day stamp tax, which facilitates Apple’s gatekeeping over software distribution, justify the immediate granting of a writ of injunction? . In light of the Ninth Circuit’s disregard for Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), and its established precedent on the significance of exclusionary conduct in Section 2 claims, beyond the confines of market definition, does this reinforce the need for an immediate writ of injunction? . Is the failure of the current Brown Shoe pricing formulas to define free apps as a relevant market, as practiced by Apple Inc., indicative of a need for the Court to revisit the original text of the Sherman Act or to refine the application of Brown Shoe, thereby supporting the issuance of an immediate writ of injunction? . Does Ninth Circuit Hicks vs. PGA Tour case law serve as a bypass to mandatory fact-finding requirements under Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), contrast with economic reality and established jurisprudence, improperly exonerate the largest monopoly in history at the pleading stage, and thereby support the necessity for an immediate writ of injunction? . Did Apple advance knowingly disingenuous positions that violated the sanctity of the oath, including irreconcilable objection to and endorsement of Epic’s relevance, and misrepresentation of Microsoft exemption for per se tying platforms? il