Elbert Walker, Jr. v. Dismas Charities, Inc., et al.
FifthAmendment Punishment
Whether a private contractor overseeing a federal prisoner's home confinement can be held liable under Bivens for alleged constitutional violations during supervised release
No question identified. : USCA11 Case: 22-13847 Document: 12-1 Date Filed: 11/14/2023 Page: 1 of 13 [DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals Hor the Eleventh Circuit No. 22-13847 Non-Argument Calendar ELBERT WALKER, JR., versus DISMAS CHARITIES, INC., CAROL OATES, KIMBERLY JOHNSON, Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia USCA11 Case: 22-13847 Document: 12-1 Date Filed: 11/14/2023 Page: 2 of 13 2 Opinion of the Court 22-13847 D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00460-MTT Before JILL PRYOR, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Elbert Walker, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s orders denying his motion for a default judgment. He also argues that the district court judge should have sua sponte recused himself due to a conflict of interest. After careful review, we affirm. I. Walker's claims in this lawsuit arise out of incidents that occurred while he was on home confinement as part of a federal criminal sentence. After Walker was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to commit arson and other crimes, he received a sentence that consisted of 121 months’ imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. In June 2020, Walker was released from prison and permitted to serve the remainder of his custodial sentence in home confinement. His home confinement was overseen by Dismas Charities, Inc., a corporation that contracted with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). While on home confinement, Walker had to obtain permission from Dismas to leave his home. In March 2021, he requested permission from Dismas to leave his home to work for a construction company. Initially, Dismas employee Kimberly Johnson approved Walker’s request. But shortly after giving approval, Johnson told Walker that he could not work for the construction USCA11 Case: 22-13847 Document: 12-1 Date Filed: 11/14/2023 Page: 3 of 13 22-13847 Opinion of the Court 3 company. Six months later, Johnson apparently changed her mind and approved Walker to work at the construction company. But a month later she again told Walker that he could not. According to Walker, there was no valid reason for Johnson’s decisions that he could not work at the construction company. In October 2021, while on home confinement, Walker sought permission from Dismas to attend religious services at a mosque. Dismas employee Carol Oates denied the request, telling Walker that it was not allowed under BOP policy. Walker filed a complaint in federal district court against Dismas, Johnson, and Oates. Walker claimed that Johnson’s decisions denying him permission to work for the construction company violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment because he did not receive a hearing. And he claimed that Oates’s decision denying him permission to attend religious services at the mosque violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Walker also alleged that these decisions constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Walker demanded money damages for the mental and physical suffering that he experienced, as well as punitive damages. He did not request any injunctive or declaratory relief. After Walker filed his complaint, he served the three defendants. The defendants failed to file a responsive pleading or otherwise defend the lawsuit, and the clerk entered a default. Walker then filed a motion for a default judgment. He argued that the allegations in the complaint established that the USCA11 Case: 22-13847 Document: 12-1 Date Filed: 11/14/2023 Page: 4 of 13 4 Opinion of the Court 22-13847 defendants had violated his constitutional rights. He requested that the district court award him $463,500 in damages. The district court denied Walker’s motion for a default judgment. It explained that after the clerk’s entry of default, the defendants were deemed to have admitted all the well-pleaded factual allegations in Walker’s complaint. But, the court cautioned, W