Whether a state's mandatory sex offender registration scheme that requires extensive personal disclosures and imposes criminal penalties for non-compliance constitutes a deprivation of liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause

No question identified. : 3. This case concerns whether a predatory offender registration scheme that requires the submission of detailed personal information about every aspect of a person’s life, where failing to provide the information and keep it up to date and accurate is a felony, impinges on a liberty interest sufficient to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause. 4, Applicant Jade Joseph Nickels is required to register as a predatory offender based on an incident that occurred more than 25 years ago when Applicant was nineteenyears old. In June 1998, the State of Minnesota charged Applicant with first-degree criminal sexual conduct and a controlled substance crime. The state and Applicant entered into an agreement under which Applicant would plead guilty to the controlled substance crime and the state would enter an amended charge of gross-misdemeanor fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct in exchange for the state’s dismissal of the first-degree charge. A condition of the plea agreement was that Applicant would not have to register as a predatory offender. Applicant subsequently pled guilty to the controlled substance crime and entered an Alford plea to fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court accepted Applicant’s plea and imposed a 17-month prison sentence on the controlled substance offense. 5. Upon his 1999 release from prison, Applicant learned that, because he was charged with the predatory offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (a charge that was dismissed) and convicted of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct (which is by definition not a predatory offense), he was required to register as a predatory offender for ten years pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 248.166 (1998) (the registration statute). Applicant has been reincarcerated several times between then and 2009; each incarceration initiated a new tenyear registration period. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(iii) (2022). 6. In February 2021, Applicant commenced a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against respondent, Drew Evans, in his official capacity as superintendent of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA). As relevant here, Applicant sought injunctive and declaratory relief based on procedural and substantive due-process violations. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint and the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 7. The trial court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Applicant had no cognizable liberty interest in avoiding registering as a predatory offender. It reached that conclusion even though the statute requires persons to provide personal information, fingerprints, and a photograph to law enforcement; annually verify their address by mail; and notify law enforcement five days before changing their address. It also requires registrants to provide law enforcement with their primary and secondary addresses; the addresses of property they own, lease, or rent; all locations where they are employed and schools where they are enrolled; the year, make, model, color, and license-plate number of all the motor vehicles they own or regularly drive and the expiration date of motor-vehicle tabs for the motor vehicles they own; and all telephone numbers. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4a(a) (2022). It also requires registrants to disclose their registration status to everyone in a healthcare facility before admission to a healthcare facility. Id., subd. 4b(b). The court of appeals reached that holding even though failing to keep this information current and accurate is a felony. See 13 Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5 (1998) (outlining the criminal penalties for failure to register and follow registration requirements). 8. This is an important question about which federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort have reached incompatible holdings. See, e.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2004