Whether a state prisoner may seek extraordinary writ relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) when state appellate courts have considered a claim on the merits despite lack of administrative exhaustion and potential RLUIPA violations

(1.) Did the Court of Appeals contravene the requirements of the appellate court’s standard of review on a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction pending an appeal? A. When a state prisoner failed to use an available state remedy — i.e., a procedure for exhausting administrative remedies — but the state appellate court, nevertheless consider the issue on the merits, is the state prisoner foreclosed from issuance by the Court of an extraordinary writ authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)? B. Assuming that the state appellate court’s action doesn’t precludes the state prisoner from petitioning the Court for an extraordinary writ authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), may the state prisoner submit the factual findings of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas and assert a violation of RLUIPA as a claim or defense and obtain injunction relief? C. If the district court’s findings of fact does not adequately support its final conclusion of law, is the standard which the Court of Appeals use to determine the likelihood of irreparable injury erroneous? (2.) Did the Court of Appeals apply erroneous standards in evaluating Petitioner’s claim of violations of his religious freedom due to his incarceration? A. Does the Kansas Preservation of Religious Freedom Act in the context of prison environment, guarantee, constitutional rights privileged under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? B. Did the Court of Appeals apply the correct standard to determine the likelihood of a substantial burden under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)? C. Are the Court of Appeals' de novo factual findings supported by the record?