Whether a federal assault statute under 18 U.S.C. § 111 can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness rather than intentional conduct

1. Whether reasonable jurists could debate whether assault against a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. $111 can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness (or, instead, requires the government to prove intentionality), when the statute provides that assault against a federal officer can be committed by means of “simple assault,” when numerous other federal assault crimes require mere recklessness, when the United States has taken the position for more than four decades that the best reading of the statute is that it can be committed recklessly, and when no controlling Tenth Circuit precedent forecloses that construction of the statute. 2. Whether reasonable jurists could debate whether a collateral attack waiver in a plea agreement is unenforceable when it would prevent a habeas petitioner from obtaining habeas relief from a crime of which he is actually innocent, when the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly held that collateral attack waivers are unenforceable in such cases, and no controlling Tenth Circuit precedent forecloses such a holding.