Brian J. Dorsey v. David Vandergriff, Warden
Punishment
Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a death-sentenced individual who has demonstrated full rehabilitation and for whom the penological goals of capital punishment would not be furthered
No question identified. : The test for granting a stay of execution in a capital case is governed by the familiar standard set forth by this Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). In the present context of a pending petition for a writ of certiorari, a stay of execution is warranted if there is a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issues sufficiently meritorious to grant discretionary review. Jd. The questions raised in Mr. Dorsey’s petition for a writ of certiorari are substantial and meritorious. It also goes without saying that Mr. Dorsey would suffer irreparable harm if his life is forfeited before this Court can review the claims in the underlying petition in a reasoned and thorough manner. The question raised in the certiorari petition involves an Eighth Amendment violation arising from the Missouri Supreme Court’s failure to recognize that a condemned person cannot be executed when the penological goals of retribution and deterrence are not furthered. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). REASONS TO STAY THE EXECUTION In deciding the present application, the Court must apply four factors: 1) whether Mr. Dorsey “has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits”; 2) whether he “will be irreparably injured absent a stay”; 3) whether a “stay will substantially injure” the State; and 4) “where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). As set forth below, all four factors are satisfied. A. Mr. Dorsey is likely to succeed on the merits. Mr. Dorsey has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits, i.e., that there is “a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari” and there is “a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision.” Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 895. Mr. Dorsey’s certiorari petition raises an “important question of federal law that has not, but should be, settled by this Court.” Sup.Ct.R. 10(c). As set forth in his certiorari petition, the underlying claim here is that Mr. Dorsey is that rare person who has demonstrated that he is fully rehabilitated and the penological goals of the death penalty would not be met by executing him. This Court has firmly held that there are categorical exceptions to execution because the goals of capital punishment would not be met. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). Furthermore, members of this Court have expressed that the goals of capital punishment are entirely frustrated by a death-sentenced person having spent years on death row. Those justices have noted that 17 years on death row meets this threshold. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting denial of certiorari) (“neither [penological] ground retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a sentence of death.”); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 929-35 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (making the same point and noting the average time spent on death row in 2015 was about 17 years); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting denial of certiorari) (“the additional deterrent effect from an actual A. Mr. Dorsey is likely to succeed on the merits. Mr. Dorsey has made a strong showing that he