Whether a theory of liability under the Fourteenth Amendment based on 'state-created danger' is incompatible with the purpose of the Due Process Clause and whether a police officer who misrepresents confinement of a threatening person assumes an affirmative constitutional duty to protect an individual from harm

Faced with a Section 1983 substantive due process claim under a “state-created danger” exception to the general rule that there is no constitutional duty to protect a private citizen from harm, the three appellate judges on the Seventh Circuit panel issued three separate opinions with three different outcomes. The disparate reasonings of the three judges on the Seventh Circuit panel, and similar divisions within the circuit courts, highlight the serious need for this Court to clarify the limitations of the remedies available under the Due Process Clause as well as the application of qualified immunity where constitutional rights are uncertain. To that end, the questions presented for review are: 1. Whether a theory of liability under the Fourteenth Amendment based on “statecreated danger” is incompatible with the purpose of the Due Process Clause “to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other?” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales , 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (“[T] he benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its ‘substantive’ manifestations.”). 2. If a theory of liability under the Fourteenth Amendment based on “state-created ii danger” exists consistent with the purpose of the Due Process Clause, does a police officer who misrepresents to an individual that a threatening person will be confined thereby assume an affirmative constitutional duty to protect that individual from harm? 3. Whether a police officer who misrepresents to an individual that a threatening person will be confined is entitled to qualified immunity in the absence of clearly established law that he thereby assumed an affirmative obligation under the Due Process Clause to protect that individual from harm? iii PARTIES TO PROCEEDING 1. Petitioner is the Estate of Te’Juan Johnson. Mr. Johnson, who passed away before this action was filed, was a police officer employed by Charlestown, Indiana. 2. Respondent is Amanda Rakes, Administrator of the Estate of Amylyn Slaymaker and next friend to the minor children G.C. and M.C. 3. Jonathan P. Roederer, a police officer employed by Charlestown, Indiana, was a party to the proceedings in the district court and the circuit court. Judgment in his favor was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. He is not involved in this Petition. iv RELATED CASES • Rakes v. Roederer, No. United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Judgment entered March 30, 2023. • Rakes v. Roederer , No. 23-1816, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Judgment entered September 25, 2024. Rehearing en banc denied November 7, 2024.