Whether Petitioners were denied their constitutional right to a 'hearing' and opportunity for oral argument under the Due Process Clause, whether Petitioners sufficiently alleged standing in a private antitrust suit involving LIBOR-based interest rates, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(6)

This is a private antitrust suit brought under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26) for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2). The questions presented are: Whether Petitioners were denied their constitutional right to a “hearing” and opportunity for an oral argument under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Whether in light of the admissions by the Respondents that the LIBOR-based intra bank interest rate used as the benchmark rate offered for loans to consumers and businesses, and all varieties of consumer financial instruments, injures and damages consumers who pay for those financial products pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, which provides that any person may bring suit for “any amount” for injury sustained by reason of the violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Whether in light of the Respondents’ admissions that the LIBOR-based intra bank interest rate used as the benchmark rate offered for loans to consumers and businesses, Petitioners sufficiently alleged standing both as a threat of injury and injury in fact, which is satisfied by their purchase of any LIBOR-based consumer loans at rates from the Respondents or their co-conspirators. ii Whether the agreed upon formula, in which each of the sixteen Participant Banks submits on a regular basis its opinion as to what the interest rate should be and Respondent ICE discards the lowest four and highest four, taking the average or mean of the remaining eight, shows the difference between the lowest suggested amount and the agreed average rate and sufficiently estimates the amount of damage suffered by the Petitioners. Whether, after the filing of the Petitioner’s case, the admission by the Respondents that their agreement to fix the LIBOR-based intra bank interest rate interbank interest rate pursuant to a formula without Congressional approval “may be restricted or prohibited by law” in the United States is an admission that the Respondents’ conduct is illegal under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Whether, contrary to this Court’s seminal decision in United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil ., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Court below erred in affirming the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal notwithstanding the “plausibility” of the allegations by the Petitioners that the Respondents’ agreement to fix the LIBOR-based intra bank interest rate used as the benchmark rate offered for loans to consumers and businesses, pursuant to a set formula without Congressional approval, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Whether contrary to the Panel’s assertion, specific intent is required for per se violations of the antitrust laws for price-fixing. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, Co. Inc., et al. , 310 U.S. 150 (1940). iii Whether the decision by the Court of Appeals finding certain Respondents beyond the reach of personal jurisdiction is contrary to Section 12 of the Clayton Act allowing jurisdiction over Respondents who were found or did business in the United States or had an effect on the commerce of the United States. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp ., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). Whether the courts below erred in prohibiting Petitioners to take jurisdictional and merit deposition discovery pursuant to Rule 12(c) and Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.