Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals misapplied Federal precedent in admitting post-Miranda statements under Elstad despite Seibert, and whether the Circuit split should be resolved under Marks

is: Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals misapplied Federal precedent when it relied on Oregon v. Elstad , 470 US 298 (1985) to admit post-Miranda admissions as opposed to excluding those admissions based on Seibert and whether the Circuit split should be resolved in favor of Marks? The second question presented is: In Cardwell v. Taylor , 461 US 571 (1983), this Court held that custodial statements that were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be grounds for habeas relief, but relief would be available if the statements were involuntary and were thus obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This Court remanded so that a determination about voluntariness could be made. In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit neither remanded nor addressed the Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim independently. Rather the Sixth Circuit opined that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims were “inextricably intertwined” and therefore, under Cardwell , habeas relief was not available. ii Whether the Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claims should have been independently reviewed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and whether relief (either granting certiorari or in granting the Petition, vacating the Sixth Circuit decision, and remand) should be granted so that the independent review can take place? The third question presented is: Since Stone v. Powell , 428 US 465 (1976) was decided, there have been numerous technological developments which have led this Court to interpret and tailor Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to respond to those technological developments. E.g., Riley v. California , 573 US 373 (2014) (cell phone technology); Carpenter v. United States , 585 US 297 (2018) (use of cell towers to track movements). This Court has also recognized exceptions to Stone , e.g., Withrow v. Williams , 507 US 680 (1993) (Fifth Amendment habeas claims are not barred by Stone). Because of the uncertainty of how Fourth Amendment principles should be applied to specific new technologies, a state criminal defendant may have an opportunity to make an argument but may not get a full and fair hearing because of those uncertainties. If habeas review is barred, the state criminal defendant may never get a meaningful review of a legitimate Constitutional question. Whether this Court should recognize an exception to Stone v. Powell which allows a Federal habeas petitioner to raise a claim that a technological development not yet addressed by this Court was a search that invaded the Petitioner’s reasonable expectation of privacy?