Whether discrimination against a potential alternate juror requires reversal without a showing of prejudice, or whether courts can review such claims for harmless error

During voir dire, the trial court granted the defendant’s peremptory challenge against Dinyal Khan, a man born in Pakistan, after expressing concern that he might “align” with Petitioners, persons of Indian ancestry who practice Sikhism, because they were members of “the same or similar type of race.” The trial court described its concern that Mr. Khan “happens to be a different race that could be aligned with the Sikh race” as its “biggest problem.” It speculated that the defendant’s witnesses would probably be “Asian or white,” and questioned whether Mr. Khan might “be absolutely against those individual[s] because they’re Asian and white, and they’re not his race and that [Petitioners] gain favor with him because they’re same or similar type of race?” The Supreme Court of Nevada denied Petitioners’ Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986), claim on appeal without considering its merits. Following the majority position of a split that has divided lower courts for nearly f o rty y ears, i t h e l d th a t an y g o v e rnm e n t-s an cti o n e d discrimination was harmless because Mr. Khan was only slotted to be an alternate and would not have deliberated, meaning his absence did not change the trial’s outcome. The question presented is whether discrimination against a potential alternate juror requires reversal without a showing of prejudice, or whether courts can review such claims for harmless error.