Whether the Commerce Clause permits a State to condition an out-of-state company's right to do business on submission to personal jurisdiction, and whether the Due Process Clause is violated by such a requirement for companies without substantial state operations

In Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. , 600 U.S. 122 (2023), “[t]he sole question before [the Court]” was “whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a large out-of-state corporation with substantial operations in a State complies with a registration requirement that conditions the right to do business in that State on the registrant’s submission to personal jurisdiction in any suits that are brought there.” Id. at 150 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). A 5-4 majority concluded “the answer to this question is no.” Id. This case presents the following two questions, which Mallory explicitly left open: 1. Whether the Commerce Clause permits a State to condition an out-of-state company’s right to do busi-ness in that State on the company’s submission to personal jurisdiction in any suits that are brought there. 2. Whether the Due Process Clause is violated where, as here, an out-of-state defendant without substantial operations in a State complies with a registration requirement that conditions the right to do busi-ness in that State on the registrant’s submission to personal jurisdiction in any suits that are brought there.