Whether a prisoner challenging a prison official's sexual misconduct must plead that the prisoner's participation was coerced in order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment

Angela Richardson, an Arkansas prisoner, engaged in sexual contact with a prison guard after the guard romantically pursued Richardson, exploited her fear of other corrections officers, and provided her with privileges and protection. When Richardson challenged the guard’s conduct under the Eighth Amendment, the District Court dismissed her claim, stating that she failed to allege that the sexual contact was nonconsensual. The Eighth Circuit affirmed for the same reason. “Other circuits have faced similar factual allegations in Eighth Amendment cases, but they have not reached a uniform conclusion.” Walton v. Nehls , 135 F.4th 1070, 1074 (7th Cir. 2025). Indeed, “there is no consensus in the federal courts on whether, or to what extent, consent is a defense to an Eighth Amendment claim based on sexual contact with a prisoner.” Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty. , 741 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 2013). The question presented is: Whether a prisoner challenging a prison official’s sexual misconduct must plead that the prisoner’s participation was coerced in order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment (as the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held) or whether a court may instead apply a rebuttable presumption that the prisoner’s participation was coerced (as the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held), or whether consent is not a defense to a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim of sexual misconduct by a prison official (as district courts in the Second and Third Circuits have held).