Can a Federal Cyberstalking prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A be used to target repeated communications on the sole basis that they would be 'reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress' in accordance with the First Amendment?

1. Can a Federal Cyberstalking prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A be used to target repeated communications on the sole basis that they would be “reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress” in accordance with the First Amendment? 2. Whether a defendant’s conviction under § 2261A may be affirmed by an appellate court based on a defamation theory not charged in the indictment or submitted to the jury. 3. Whether the Fifth Circuit’s defamation finding in Uhlenbrock conflicts with the mens rea standards articulated in Counterman v. Colorado and Garrison v. Louisiana.