Whether time spent on 'integral and indispensable' activities is measured based on reasonable duration or actual duration

For the last three decades, this Court’s atextual interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in Steiner v. Mitchell , 350 U.S. 247 (1956), has both exploded in importance and fostered confusion, prompting two attempts at clarification by this Court while imposing billions in liability on employers. In Steiner, this Court relied primarily on snippets of legislative history to expand FLSA liability contrary to clear statutory text. Shortly after the FLSA was originally passed, this Court construed the term “work” to include “preliminary activities” such as changing clothes. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692-693 (1946). Congress responded with the Portal-to-Portal Act, which amends the FLSA to say “preliminary and postliminary” activities are not compensable and only “princi pal” activities are. But in Steiner, this Court again expanded FLSA liability by creating a third category: “preliminary and postliminary” activities deemed to be “principal activities” if a court or jur y finds them “integral and indispensable” to such principal activities. The questions presented are: 1. Whether time spent on “integral and indispensable” activities is meas ured based on reasonable duration (as three circuits have held), or actual duration (as four circuits have held). 2. Whether this Court should overrule Steiner.