Is exclusion of reliable, probative evidence of guilt warranted to deter an outside officer's misconduct where there are other deterrents that do not deprive the jury of critical evidence, and where the investigative team operated in good faith?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The exclusionary rule, which bars the admission of ill-gotten gains, exists for the sole purpose of deterring intentional, egregious police misconduct in the collection of evidence. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231-32, 246 (2011). But in applying the exclusionary rule, courts must weigh the deterrence benefit against the steep societal costs of excluding reliable, probative evidence of guilt and the defendant’s potential evasion of prosecution. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984). The rule is not effective when deterrence is only marginal, especially when the officers acted in good faith. Jd. at 918-19. And the justification for exclusion is attenuated when it results from the actions of someone outside the prosecution team. Indeed, federal courts consistently hold that the prosecution is not held responsible for an outside officer’s possession of exculpatory information. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 32 F.4th 22, 35 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)). The questions presented are: 1. Is exclusion of reliable, probative evidence of guilt warranted to deter an outside officer’s misconduct where there are other deterrents that do not deprive the jury of critical evidence, and where the investigative team operated in good faith? 2. Does a rule holding the State responsible for an outside officer’s conveyance of an inculpatory tip, where the officer failed to disclose that the tip came from a privileged source, conflict with the rule that the prosecution is not liable for an outside officer’s possession of exculpatory information?