Whether a court can use the implicit Rule 11(b) certification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that automatically attaches to all attorneys' paper submissions as a vehicle to find bad faith under the high standards of 1927 and inherent powers

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Courts must find subjective bad faith to impose sanctions under inherent powers or 28 U.S.C. $1927 (“1927”). Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); Schlatfer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 1999). The District Court assumed bad faith without factual evidence by ; improperly utilizing the inapplicable Rule 11 of the Federal : Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 11”). The District Court found no bad faith prior to Petitioner Johnmack Cohen Esq’s (“Cohen”) January 13, 2020 motion in imine, only finding bad faith from “from this filing forward” because “{alfter all [Rule] 11(b) was now implicated,” specifically the “affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before filing.” Pet. App. 104a-110a(quoting Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comme’ns Enters., Inc., : 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991). The District Court further stated, “...in signing the moving papers, [pursuant to the implicit Rule 11(b) certification], [Petitioner] . attested that he had made the necessary inquiry . into the factual allegations substantiating the claims. As such, any misrepresentations . . . [about Plaintifi’s other litigation] from this filing forward could not have been made in good faith .. .” and since “the procedural prerequisites to impose sanctions under Rule 11 for this filing are not satisfied here, ... the Court is forced to rely on its inherent power and [] 1927.” Id. at 108a-110a. The Second Circuit affirmed without analysis on this . issue. Id. at la-4a, 131a-132a. Question 1: Whether a court can use the implicit Rule ; 11(b) certification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure u that automatically attaches to all attorneys’ paper submissions as a vehicle to find bad faith under the high standards of 1927 and inherent powers. 2. The linchpin to the District Court’s bad faith finding was Petitioner Cohen’s January 18, 2020 motion in limine wherein Petitioner Cohen described Plaintiff’s previous litigation against his prior attorney as a fee dispute (Plaintiff’s “Bronx Action”). Pet. App. _ 104a-110a. Petitioner Cohen’s January 13, 2020 motion in limine that detailed Plaintiff’s Bronx Action as a fee dispute was based on Plaintiff’s sworn deposition . testimony that detailed this other litigation as a fee dispute; Specifically, on September 23, 2019, Plaintiff ; testified at his deposition under oath under penalty ; of perjury generally describing Plaintiff’s previous litigation against his prior attorney as a fee dispute, never stating this other litigation involved a relevant intentional infliction of emotional distress (“ITED”) claim, Fordham University and resulted in two appeals. . (Compare A!78-74 to A122 at A1233 at A1262 at p.250:8: 25—p.251:1-23). The District Court specifically “.. . credit[ed] [Petitioner Cohen’s] representation that ‘{a]t all times material, [Petitioner Cohen] was only generally aware of a fee dispute between Plaintiff and his prior attorney, and nothing further’, which impression was reinforced . . . by Plaintiff throughout the litigation,” and that “Plaintiff consistently and systematically concealed relevant and unfavorable facts and documents .. . from [Petitioner Cohen and DSLG].” Pet. App. 121a 1. Denotes Joint