Whether the Second Circuit's interpretation of 'proximate cause' under RICO is unreasonably narrow and fails to honor the statute's breadth

QUESTION PRESENTED Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §1960-1968, in order for a cause of action to lie, the plaintiff must be able to establish both legal “but-for” causation as well as proximate or “by reason of” cause. Proximate cause is a flexible concept that labels generically the judicial tools used to limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts.” Holmes v Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992). Proximate cause considers the permissible degree of attenuation between the claimed harm and the predicate act and requires “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged”. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U.S. 258 (1992). The standard for proximate cause under RICO “is generous enough to include the unintended though foreseeable consequences of RICO predicate acts, including, in some instances, harms that flow from, or are derivative, of each other. Diaz v Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9t Cir. 2005). The Question for the Court is: Whether the Second Circuit’s interpretation of “proximate cause” is unreasonable because it fails to honor the breadth of the RICO statute and ignores the Supreme Court’s admonition that there is no bright line standard and proximate cause must be carefully considered under a flexible standard carefully considering the circumstances of each individual case.